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As commentators on this blog and elsewhere have rightly noted, since the beginning
of 2018 the CJEU has finally been putting flesh on the bones of the EU principle of
judicial independence. Most recently, the Court has been widely praised for its ruling
against the Polish attempt of removing the, presumably, disloyal judges by a general
measure of lowering their retirement age from 70 to 65. While the decision is indeed
praiseworthy, it is nevertheless necessary to emphasize its notable doctrinal lacuna
with potential negative practical implications – particularly in those EU member
states with a weak democratic and rule of law tradition, a low degree of legal and
political culture as well as with a small and tightly-knit legal elite.
In the most recent case against Poland (C-619/18), the CJEU explained what
has already become part and parcel of its established case-law: that judicial
independence features an external and an internal aspect. Accordingly, the external
one “requires that the court concerned exercises its functions wholly autonomously,
without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body
and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being
protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent
judgment of its members and to influence their decisions (C-619/18, para. 72).
Whereas the internal dimension of judicial independence “is for its part linked to
impartiality and seeks to ensure that an equal distance is maintained from the parties
to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of
those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest
in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of
law.” (ibid., para. 73). To understand the doctrinal lacuna, perhaps even a flaw, in
this reasoning, consider the following example.
A story yet untold
Once upon a time, almost thirty years ago, a country secured its independence and
pledged to part with five decades of a totalitarian regime and to embark on a new
path of the rule of law and democracy. Despite an overwhelming popular support
for the “return to Europe”, the political spectrum was much more divided and the old
institutions proved to be sticky. In particular in the field of judiciary. This was, to be
distinguished from its bourgeois counterparts, couched into a massive bureaucratic
hierarchical structure, composed of hundreds of anonymous judges in service of
justice as defined by the presidents of their respective courts, and as supervised
by the president of the Supreme Court, who was simultaneously a member of the
central committee of the Communist Party. This type of judiciary was, of course,
not intended to be independent. The old Constitution, in the absence of separation
of powers, did not require any such bourgeois oddity. The new Constitution did
though, but in practice the old dependent judges were, as a rule, transformed into
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new independent judiciary with tenure, while being still presided over, more than
symbolically, until 1993 by the same individual from the Central Committee.
As years, indeed decades, have passed, this judiciary has evolved, transformed and
mutated, but the essence of the old bureaucratic hierarchical structure has remained
in place, with the individuals who were still forming as judges in the 1980s, now
enjoying the climax of their career at the Supreme Court. This judiciary is, thanks to
the numerous constitutional and statutory safeguards which have been sufficiently
applied also in practice, externally independent. It has not been, as the CJEU rightly
proscribes, subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body
outside itself. Also, in terms of impartiality, that the CJEU constructs as an internal
element of judicial independence, other than the usual public and political criticism,
there have been no major events that would put this judicial principle into question.
However, there has been something that the CJEU case-law does not appear to
catch. First, there has been some unusual traffic between the judiciary and the
executive branch traditionally controlled by the post-communist left. Most recently,
the former expert head of the judicial office for communication at the Supreme Court
switched to the political position of state secretary in the Ministry of Justice, replacing
the former political state secretary who returned to her former position of the now
again expert head of the judicial office for communication at the same Supreme
Court. This person is a wife of the vice-president of the Supreme Court, who has
recently made “important” moves for denouncing his fellow Supreme Court judge
to the commission for judicial ethics, which is chaired by the vice-president’s former
wife. That latter initially refused to recuse herself, but did so when the disobedient
Supreme Court judge has been denounced to the judicial ethics commission yet
again, this time around by the president of the Supreme Court himself. The rogue
justice has namely publicly criticized the malpractice in judicial self-government,
exposed evident pressures on the independence of individual judges, and gave
evidence of tampering with the personal files of judges affecting their chances
of promotion and interfering with their right to privacy at the working place. Last
but not least, just recently the unmannered judge responded to the invitation of
the Parliament’s Judicial Committee and attended its session against the explicit
instructions to the contrary by the president of the Supreme Court.  After the failure
of the initial intra-institutional attempts of silencing the naughty judge, who asserted
his right to freedom of expression and indeed his institutional duty to criticize the
malpractice of the leadership of the Supreme Court, he has now found himself under
the pressure of a growing number of procedures conducted against him by the very
same judicial leadership he had dared to publicly criticize.
The difficult fight against invisible internal
dependence
This type of case, in which no external, be it political or executive, body needs
to interfere with the judiciary since it has already been synchronized with those
political expectations due to the institutional legacy of the past and the specific
germination of the legal (including judicial) elite, does not raise the problem of
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external judicial independence. However, what is clearly at stake is internal judicial
independence, but not within the meaning of impartiality of a judge or a court – the
latter is in my opinion an independent legal principle, admittedly connected to, but
still separate from the principle of judicial independence – rather within the meaning
of an independence of a single judge, of a judge as an individual.
The independence of a judge as an individual is indeed the cornerstone of judicial
independence. For it is obvious that the courts cannot function as collectively
independent institutions of power, if and when they are composed of dependent
judges. This dependence can be achieved by external interference, but the latter
is typically blunt and widely visible, which makes it relatively easy to fight against
and to prevent it. However, the dependence of judges can also be generated intra-
systemically, when the judicial system is structured bureaucratically and controlled
by a strong and politically connected ruling judicial class that uses informal collegial
as well as formal means to control and, if necessary, also silence those judges
who do not conform to the system. As this model requires no external political
interference, or the latter is even hypocritically called upon to restore the collective
institutional independence threatened by the individual disobedient judges, it is
much more difficult to be detected, deciphered and countered. However, it poses
an identical, but perhaps even a graver, threat to judicial independence of individual
judges than the external, openly political interference by the other branches of
power.
This de facto internal independence of an individual judge, including from their
externally institutionally independent system of judiciary, literally from their peers,
especially when they are not as virtuous as ideally required, is something that has
eclipsed the recent CJEU case-law on judicial independence. Most likely, this has
been the case, since the issue simply was not raised. However, this does not mean
that the problem does not exist. I am afraid the example of Slovenia, that the very
real fairy tale recounted above factually draws upon, can be extrapolated at least
across Central and Eastern Europe, if not even more widely. At the very least, the
CJEU should thus nuance its interpretation of internal judicial independence, which
should not be just about impartiality, but about an actual internal independence of an
individual judge.
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